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When the concept of homology is operationalized with
synapomorphy and tested with character congruence,
homology and homoplasy are treated as a complement
relation, a and not-a, respectively. This leaves homoplasy
to be defined nominally, something like operational
“error” in the inference of homology. In choosing the
most severely tested and least disconfirmed cladogram,
those errors are minimized, and the power of that clado-
gram to explain synapomorphies, as inherited from the
same common ancestral condition, is correspondingly
maximized. Tests of predictions of homoplasy can lead
to the elimination of those kinds of error. The comple-
and “test.” Karl Popper’s writings predominate in this
DESCRIPTIVE GENERALIZATIONS
Descriptive generalizations demand an explanation,
and generalizations and explanations are of two basicmentary relationship between homology and homoplasy
is considered one of reciprocal clarification, not episte-
mological dependence. q 1999 The Willi Hennig Society
INTRODUCTION
The question prompting this discussion of homology
and homoplasy is whether synapomorphy can be ex-
plained deductively and be a test of sister-group rela-
tionships.2 At recent Willi Hennig Society meetings,
1E-mail: akluge@umich.edu.
2My use of the term synapomorphy is a literal one, “a shared-
derived character state,” and such a definition continues to allow
for characters later judged to be homoplasious (wing, as in bats and
in birds). Also, strictly speaking, my use of the term homology does
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omorphy cannot constitute disconfirming evidence of
competing cladograms, because synapomorphy is the
effect a cladogram is intended to explain. In other
words, synapomorphy as evidence does not meet the
scientific standard of independence, and therein, ac-
cording to Fitzhugh, lies a fallacy. Fitzhugh’s conjecture
of non-independence may be considered a particularly
serious challenge to phylogenetic systematics, because
it denies that the most severely tested and least discon-
firmed cladogram can also maximize explanatory
power (sensu Farris, 1983). According to Fitzhugh, it
would be circular to propose that. In an attempt to
better understand the issues, pro and con, I briefly
review the concepts of “explanation,” “prediction,”discussion, because Fitzhugh’s claim of non-indepen-
dence between cladogram and synapomorphy is
couched in terms of Popperianism.not exclude symplesiomorphy (salamander forelimbs and bird wings
are homologous as tetrapod fore-appendages). Thus, in my view,
synapomorphy and homology are not synonymous.
C, specific initial condition(s) (cause)430
kinds—what I will call universal and historical. Identi-
fying the kind of descriptive generalization at hand
depends on the general theory (e.g., law) that can be
rationally justified as an explanation (Hull, 1974). Con-
sider the following generalizations: (a) All atoms with
an atomic number 79 are gold. (b) All swans are white.
Atomic theory provides a universal type of explanation
of the former descriptive generalization, whereas Dar-
winian theory provides an historical type of explana-
tion of the latter.3 Why? Atomic theory is concerned
with spatio-temporally unrestricted generalizations,
the particular instances of which are historically inde-
pendent, their identity being a matter of intentional
definition (Frost and Kluge, 1994). Darwinian theory,
on the other hand, pertains to spatio-temporally re-
stricted things, such as organisms and species, which
are connected by descent, and are therefore necessarily
unique. Swans may then be understood as constituting
a clade, which is defined extensionally in terms of
feather color—the observed white feature having been
“inherited” from a common ancestral white swan.
A universal explanation has long been thought of as
a causal explanation, in so far as it is “an explanation of
an explanation” (Mill, 1862: 510). Regarding historical
explanation, as Mill put it,
“[a]n individual fact is said to be explained by pointing out its
cause, that is, by stating the law or laws . . . of which its produc-
tion is an instance.”
This is what has been called a singular event, contin-
gent, or historical explanation. Thus, we have universal
and historical descriptive generalizations and univer-
sal and historical explanations, correspondingly. Both
kinds of explanations can be causal.
A DEDUCTIVE MODEL OF HISTORICAL
EXPLANATION
In the main, Popper found Mill’s distinction between
universal and historical explanations quite acceptable;
however, he sought to give greater precision to expla-
nation, as indicated by the following quote (Popper,
1957: 122):3Not withstanding the fact that “all swans are white” has been
employed as a universal generalization (see discussion by Hull,
1974: 78).
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“I suggest that to give a causal explanation of a certain specific
event means deducing a statement describing this event from
two kinds of premises: from some universal laws, and from some
singular or specific statements which we may call the specific
initial conditions.”
These premises are labeled L and C, respectively, along
with E denoting the event, or effect, in a deductive
model of explanation. Explanation is achieved by de-
ducing effect from cause, in light of a law or some
general theory.4 Summarizing,
L, explaining law(s)explanation
E, specific event (effect).
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
The general explanatory theory most commonly ap-
pealed to in phylogenetic systematics was framed by
Darwin (1859). Darwin’s theory can be summarized
in terms of three inclusive evolutionary principles: (i)
descent, (ii) with modification, and (iii) due to natural
selection.5 It continues to surprise some that Popper
accepted the scientific character of much, if not all, of
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Relevant to the current
question, Popper (1957: 106–107; 1972; 1980) was
explicit:
“What we call the evolutionary hypothesis is an explanation
of a host of biological and paleontological observations—for
instance, of certain similarities between various species and
genera—by the assumption of common ancestry of related
forms.2 This hypothesis is not a universal law, even though
certain universal laws of nature, such as laws of heredity, segre-
gation, and mutation, enter with it into the explanation. It has
rather, the character of a particular (singular or specific) histori-
cal statement.”
4The deductive-nomological model of Hempel and Oppenheim
(1948) applies strictly to universal descriptive generalizations, where
a genuine universal law is assumed necessarily. Moreover, those
authors were especially concerned with the symmetry between ex-
planation and prediction. My use of a similar deductive schema is
special and self-contained, in that it is employed in a philosophical
analysis of a particular kind of historical inference.
5“Phylogenetically evolved adaptations qua adaptations are the
primary explanandum of natural selection, the central mechanism
of neo-Darwinian theory” (Amundson, 1994: 560).
ence of phylogeny also followed Popper. Consider thatExplanation, Prediction, and Test
“2Feeling somewhat intimidated by the tendency of evolution-
ists to suspect anyone of obscurantism who does not share their
emotional attitude toward evolution as a ‘daring and revolu-
tionary challenge to traditional thought,’ I had better say here
that I see in modern Darwinism the most successful explanation
of the relevant facts.”
I conclude from this quote, in addition to wholeheart-
edly endorsing neo-Darwinism, that Popper explained
the historical descriptive generalization of certain
shared similarities (synapomorphies) among terminal
taxa in terms of inheritance (common ancestry), in light
of the evolutionary principles of “descent, with modi-
fication.”
Taking my cue from Popper (1957), I too will assume
Darwin’s principles of “descent, with modification,”
as the necessary explaining theories (L) in a deductive
historical model of explanation, with cladogram, and
its common ancestral relations, constituting the specific
initial condition (C ) and synapomorphy the specific
event to be explained (E ). Summarizing:




Defining the concept of homology as “features (parts,
attributes) that were present in the common ancestor
in which they are homologous” (Ghiselin, 1984), we
are led to an inheritance model of explanation:
L, descent, with modification
C, cladogram
explanation of inheritance
E, synapomorphy as homology.
This definition of homology in terms of cladogram
is not circular, because phylogeny is not defined in
terms of homology (Ghiselin, 1966). Although this
definition of homology may be sufficient ontologically,
it contains no reference to operationalisms, such as the
“similarity” of homologous adult features or their
ontogenies.
Unknown to Popper is the fact that, in operationaliz-
ing the concept of homology, not all synapomorphies
can be explained in terms of common ancestry. When
two synapomorphies are incongruent, both cannot be
interpreted as homologous—the shared-derived states
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of at least one of those two sets must have originated
independently. From this fact one might derive a com-
plementary model for homoplasy, which would imply
that “descent, with modification,” can also explain ho-
moplasy:
L, descent, with modification
C, cladogram
explanation of independent origins
E, synapomorphy as homoplasy.
Complicating matters, Farris (1983) pointed out that
while “descent, with modification,” may be required
in the inference of synapomorphy as homoplasy, those
assumptions are not sufficient to explain synapomor-
phy as homology—an additional assumption(s) being
required (Fig. 1). Further, in defining phylogenetic par-
simony in terms of the “minimization of requirements
for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy,” Farris was sim-
ply following a well-known tenet of Popper’s (e.g.,
1983) philosophy of science—avoid all assumptions,
except those required as background knowledge.
Farris’ (1983) emphasis on homoplasy in the infer-the logical form of the conditional of cladogram/ho-
mology is modus ponens, if p then q/p/therefore q,
FIG. 1. “Descent, with modification,” are sufficient assumptions
in the inference of homoplasy, but not of homology (Farris, 1983).
Let “descent” and “with modification” connote cladogram and syna-
pomorphy, respectively. (A) Homoplasy in some form is deduced
when conjoining a cladogram with an incongruent synapomorphy.
(B) However, conjoining a cladogram with a congruent synapomor-
phy does not by itself lead to a deduction of homology, because the
two assumptions do not rule out the possibility of parallelism. An
additional assumption of evolutionary process is required to cover
all cases of inference of two synapomorphous states being inherited
from the same common ancestral condition, i.e., being homologous.
p(e,b) ¿ 1/2. If the evidence would seem to follow432
whereas cladogram/homoplasy is the contrapositive
conditional, modus tollens, if p then q/not-q/therefore
not-p. Modus ponens is an invalid form of deductive
inference, assuming just “descent, with modification,”
because the premises (L and C ) do not preclude the
“if not-p, then q” argument. To affirm the consequent
(q) does not necessarily establish p. The two possible
deductive historical models for explaining synapomor-
phy may then be stated as:
Inheritance model of explanation (modus ponens: if p
then q/p/therefore q):
L, descent, with modification
L, something more must be assumed
C, cladogram
explanation of inheritance
E, synapomorphy as homology.
Independent origins model of “explanation” (modus
tollens: if p then q/not-q/therefore not-p):
L, descent, with modification
C, cladogramexplanation of independent origins
with modification,” (b), synapomorphies (e , e , e , . . .E, synapomorphy as homoplasy.
POPPERIAN TESTABILITY
Popperian testability provides a basis for under-
standing the concept of test as one of falsification. Test-
ability involves the logical relationships between sever-
ity of test, S(e,h,b), and degree of corroboration,
C(h,e,b),
S(e, h, b) 5 C (h, e, b) 5 ( p (e, hb) 2 p(e, b))/ . . . ,
where e is evidence, h is hypothesis, and b is back-
ground knowledge.6 The significant numerator in Pop-
per’s expression of testability is the difference between
the evidence with, p(e,hb), and without, p(e,b), the
6p in this context denotes propensity, a physical interpretation of
the possibilities; p does not pertain to precise probabilities, such as
frequencies, which are abstractions (Popper, 1983: 286). The logical
development of Popper’s severity of test and degree of corroboration
has been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Kluge, 1997a).
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hypothesis, in light of the background knowledge. Put
even more simply, testability is a measure of how much
the hypothesis increases the likelihood of the evidence.
Also noteworthy, regarding minimizing assumptions,
the hypothesis receives a higher degree of corrobora-
tion the smaller the p(e,b) and in particular whenfrom background knowledge alone, then the hypothe-
sis contributes little, and degree of corroboration is low.
EXPLANATION AND EXPLANATORY
POWER
Farris (1983: 18) was the first to point out that “[t]he
explanatory power of a genealogy is . . . measured by
the degree to which it can avoid postulating homopla-
sies,” and from which he derived the phylogenetic
parsimony criterion, “the minimization of require-
ments for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy.” When
exercising this criterion, synapomorphies hypothe-
sized as homologies are maximized on the cladogram
that exhibits the fewest number of hypothesized evolu-
tionary “modifications” (transformations, steps). Ac-
cording to Carpenter et al. (1998: 106), this connection
between parsimony and explanation in testability was
anticipated by Popper (1959: 401), who stated that
“[f]or any given [evidence] y, C(x,y) [the corroboration of theory
x by y] increases with the power of x to explain y.”
In explicating Popperian testability and Farris’ argu-
ment for explanatory power in phylogenetic systemat-
ics, I have taken as standard practice the simultaneous
analysis of a matrix of synapomorphies (see also Kluge,
1997a), where the matrix constitutes an array of evi-
dence (e1, e2, e3, . . . en), and the number of terminal taxa
on which the synapomorphies are scored determine
the set of possible cladograms, an array of competing
hypotheses (h1, h2, h3, . . . hn). Also, I assume “descent,
with modification,” as necessary background knowl-
edge (b). Thus, for example, in the simple case of three
terminal taxa, A, B, and C, there are three possible
rooted cladograms: h1, (A,B)C; h2, (A,C)B; and h3,
(B,C)A. Further, given just the assumptions of “descent,1 2 3
en) characteristic of the competing cladograms (h1, h2,
h3) should be equally likely, ceteris paribus. However,
Explanation, Prediction, and Test
if a large majority of one of those possible classes of
synapomorphies were to be discovered, for the sake
of argument assume it is the class which characterizes
h1, then this finding is unlikely given the background
knowledge alone, but not under the background knowl-
edge plus the postulated cladogram ((A,B)C). There-
fore, h1 is the most highly corroborated, most severely
tested of the three competing cladograms—C(h1,e,b)
. C(h2,e,b) or C(h3,e,b), assuming only “descent, with
modification.” Further, in choosing the least falsified7
cladogram—according to Farris’ phylogenetic parsi-
mony criterion, minimizing requirements for ad hoc
propositions of homoplasy—h1 is maximally explana-
tory, more synapomorphies being interpretable as ho-
mologues on h1 than on h2 or h3. This simple example
also exposes the unnecessary nature of model assump-
tions in phylogenetic inference—the background
knowledge of descent, with modification, being suffi-
cient to make a rationally justified and meaningful
explanation of homology of uniquely evolved histori-
rors,” then ways must be found to test synapomorphiescal generalizations.
THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENT TESTS
Fitzhugh’s (1998: 35) position can now be stated more
precisely—if the causal condition of cladogram (C )
leads to an explanation of the current known effects
of synapomorphy (E ), then synapomorphy (e) cannot
be used as an independent test of competing clado-
grams (h1, h2, h3, . . . hn). Although Fitzhugh stated the
problem as if it were a fallacy of epistemological non-
independence, it is my contention that the reasoning
is not logically erroneous (see also Hull, 1967). Rather,
the apparent problem is simply a consequence of de-
fining the possible effects of synapomorphy as a com-
plement relation—that synapomorphy which is not
due to a common ancestral origin (homology) must be
of independent origin (homoplasy). An incongruent
7As with all singular descriptive generalizations, phylogenetic sys-
tematics can have only modest pretensions when it comes to falsifi-
cation. For example, evidence in the form of synapomorphy can
only constitute a weak form of falsification, because a synapomorphy
test statement can only “count against” a cladogram, unlike a univer-
sal descriptive generalization being falsified by any one test (Hull,
1983; Sober, 1983: 339; contra Felsenstein, 1988: 529–530).
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synapomorphy, homoplasy, constitutes falsifying evi-
dence (e), and explanatory power is necessarily max-
imized in choosing the least falsified cladogram, be-
cause the congruent synapomorphies must be
explained as having common ancestral origins (i.e.,
homologies). There seems to be no escape from this
conclusion given just “descent, with modification,”
and employing the parsimony criterion of minimizing
ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy, which may be de-
limited according to the test of congruence.
However, if homoplasy is defined as independent
origins, how can homoplasy be explained? Homoplasy
cannot be explained in terms of “descent, with modifi-
cation,” because homoplasious states, by definition,
constitute a spatio-temporally, historically unconnec-
ted, set of things. Although not to be confused with
causal explanation, a possible explanation for homo-
plasy is simply one of “error,” systematic and/or sam-
pling. Further, as Popper (1972: 359) argued, if progress
in science consists of trials “in the elimination of er-as homoplasy, for otherwise phylogenetic systematics
would not be progressive.
PREDICTION
If we can only adduce homoplasy as evidence count-
ing against cladograms, and homology as coinciden-
tally explained on the least disconfirmed hypotheses
of sister-group relationships, we may feel that our ex-
planation is circular and therefore quite unsatisfactory
(Popper, 1972: 351). However, there remains the possi-
bility of testing cladograms, and synapomorphies iden-
tified as homoplasies, according to prediction. Popper
(1957: 124) clarifies such possibilities:
“. . . the use of a theory for predicting some specific event is just
another aspect of its use for explaining such an event. And since
we test a theory by comparing the events predicted with those
actually observed, our analysis also shows how theories can
be tested. Whether we use a theory for the purpose of explana-
tion, of prediction, or of testing, depends upon our interest; it
depends upon the question which statements we consider as
given or unproblematic, and which statements we consider to
stand in need of further criticism, and of testing.”
Popper’s (1957: 134) favorable reference to a system-
atic botany study (Frankel, 1941) illustrates how he
believed observations guided by theory can lead to
further tests. I have argued elsewhere (Kluge, 1997b)
434that independent testing in phylogenetic systematics
lies in sophisticated falsification.
SOPHISTICATED FALSIFICATION
According to Lakatos (1993: 116), falsification must
be “sophisticated,” in the sense that there is an inter-
play between evidence (e) and competing hypotheses
(h1, h2, h3, . . . hn) that “leads to the discovery of novel
facts.” Such a progressive problem shift indicates a
situation in which h1 suggests something more than
h2 suggested, as well as suggesting more than is re-
quired by the data themselves.
As I have argued above, phylogenetic systematics
may lay claim to explanation in testability, if only coin-
cidentally in the “minimization of requirements for ad
hoc hypotheses of homoplasy.” However, that does not
mean an increase in knowledge has been achieved,
because all competing cladograms exhibit the same
empirical content, 1 2 p(h, b). Therefore, for example,
in the case of three competing cladograms, C(h1,e,b)
may be judged the most severely tested and least falsi-
fied and having greater explanatory power than either
C(h2,e,b) or C(h3,e,b). However, from this it does not
follow that C(h1,e,b) also provides increased knowl-
edge (sensu Lakatos, 1993).
Increased knowledge may, however, be claimed in
phylogenetic systematics by making testable predic-
tions from the most highly corroborated cladogram,
where that particular hypothesis is an initial condition
in its own logical deductive argument. Possible predic-
tions and tests include the following (Kluge, 1997b).
A re-analysis of certain characters predicted by the
least falsified cladogram might be understood as ex-
plaining more in greater detail about synapomorphies.
For example, the developmental and genetic dis-
tinctness of homoplasious states has the potential to
be disconfirmed [e.g., in terms of the individualization
studies of Wagner (1989a,b)]. Further, we may even
claim a test of evolutionary theory itself. For example,
incongruences between the least falsified cladogram
and best-fitting hierarchical hypotheses obtained from
other historical sciences (e.g., the study of co-evolution,
relative age of origin, and events of earth history) are
disconfirmations of descent.
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DISCUSSION
To be able to explain congruent synapomorphies as
homologues on the most severely tested and least falsi-
fied cladogram is judged a consequence of defining
homology and homoplasy as a complement relation,
a and not-a, respectively. However, in this sense, homo-
plasy is an abstraction and may be understood only
nominally, e.g., as some minimal amount of error in
the inference of homology.8 Of course, one could avoid
having to propose error by providing a “real” defini-
tion of homoplasy, but that would require evoking a
universal kind of explanation for a descriptive general-
ization of independently originating traits. I doubt
many evolutionary biologists will entertain this possi-
bility (however, see e.g., Lauder, 1982: 65; 1990: 332),
because their focus is on historical explanations, as
it is when they assume “descent, with modification.”
Moreover, the evolutionary biologist can always take
the easy, unscientific way out and simply choose to
explain homoplasious states as a set of homologues,
i.e., as different synapomorphies characteristic of less
inclusive groups of species. Of course, there is no test
of error in this action.
In any case, only when phylogeny is known can it be
said that the present effect of homology is necessarily
deduced. Merely attempting to recognize the effects
an hypothesis is intended to explain is not the same as
actually having done so, as in the case of enumerative
induction. Various operations in phylogenetic infer-
ence, such as defining homology and homoplasy as a
complement relation, may lead to the appearance of
epistemological dependence, and while those practices
may be questioned (sensu Fitzhugh, 1998) they cannot
be condemned as “viciously circular” (Hull, 1967: 177).
I suggest the relationship between homology and ho-
moplasy, at least potentially, is one of reciprocal clarifi-
cation (Hennig, 1966); the more we test incongruent
synapomorphies for error, the more our competing cla-
dograms will be severely tested and the more our
hypotheses of homology will be corroborated.
Science has been defined as a concern for explana-
tion, prediction, and testing. I conclude that all three
8Coddington (1994) reached the same conclusion that some homo-
plasy is error. His argument was based on a statistical analogy,
whereas my conclusion that all homoplasy is error follows from a
deductive model of inference.
Explanation, Prediction, and Test
criteria can be met when phylogenetic systematics is
practiced according to Popperian testability (Popper,
1983) and the most-parsimonious cladogram is ac-
cepted as the working hypothesis from which testable
predictions are made. Those predictions may include
tests of homoplasy and descent. In these kinds of possi-
bilities there is the independent testability of the prem-
ises, the statement of the explaining laws and specific
initial conditions, which Popper (1972: 349) argued is
the “very heart” of explanation.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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